And thus, it is not so much that there is one theory of evil, but rather that, for Aristotle, there are almost as many ways to talk of badness as of goodness ('The good is said in many ways' Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096a23).
Instead, there are different ways of thinking about 'evil' in many areas of Aristotle's thought, as the introduction hints at by going through the different meanings of the Greek term ta kaka (bad or evil things) within a single Greek tragedy. The further claim that there is something like a 'theory of evil' in Aristotle is more tenuous and is not in fact explored in most of the essays. The volume certainly shows how much scope there is in Aristotle's writings to map out his various explanations of bad things. A claim the book wishes to 'defend' is 'that Aristotle has a theory of evil that is both highly elaborate and attractive' (p.1). In the past, most have assumed that since he has neither an evil intelligence, like Satan, nor a source of everything bad, such as Plato's receptacle, there is no theory of evil in Aristotle. This collection constitutes the first focused treatment of Aristotle on evil. How then, does evil get a foothold? Extreme badness is for Aristotle not something substantial or a source or principle in its own right but rather the absence or privation of good. Furthermore, there is no contrary to this 'primary being' ( Metaphysics XII.10, 1075b20-24). Badness does not exist in the category of substance, whereas the supreme god is existence par excellence. In Aristotle's philosophy, there is no source or principle of evil as there is of good ( Metaphysics IX.9, 1051a19-21).
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